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8Introduction: Dilemmas of Democracy
The referendum on Scotland’s independence has highlighted a number of 
tensions and contradictions that characterize contemporary Western lib-
eral democracy. On the one hand, the two-year campaign re-energized 
politics and re-engaged the citizenry after decades of popular alienation 
and anger. A public debate unfolded that revealed not only a surprisingly 
knowledgeable electorate and an unprecedented mobilization, including 
a younger cohort, as 16- to 18-year-olds were for the first time given the 
right to vote. It was also conducted in a civil and generally good-natured 
manner. Most importantly of all was perhaps the engagement with many of 
the real issues that face Scotland—cultural identity and political represen-
tation, the relationship between ordinary people and the governing elites, 
as well as the impact of globalization and the purpose of politics. Dubbed 
a “festival of democracy,” the referendum has confirmed the deep-seated 
distrust of politicians but also the desire for genuine alternatives to the 
established order and demands by an empowered electorate for substance 
rather than sound-bites. 
On the other hand, the official referendum campaign quickly became 
a contest between the populism of the Scottish National Party that advo-
cated independence and the technocracy of the “Better Together” team 
that defended Scotland’s membership in the British Union. While the 
former portrayed an independent Scotland as a progressive “heaven on 
earth,” the latter issued a series of warnings and thinly veiled threats—
no common currency, no automatic membership in the European Union, 
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and no shared defense umbrella. Especially in the last few months before 
the vote on September 18, there was growing evidence of intimation by 
the Yes camp that sought to portray the No side as unpatriotic. When the 
opinion polls, which played a decisive role in the closing stages, showed 
a narrow lead for the Yes, the Westminster establishment in London 
woke up to the imminent threat of the UK’s break-up. Amid panic and 
the belated recognition that a relentlessly negative campaign had spec-
tacularly backfired, the three unionist parties (the Conservatives, Labour, 
and the Liberal-Democrats) made a solemn vow to devolve extensive 
powers to the Scottish Parliament akin to Irish home rule—a last-minute 
promise that has led to a series of constitutional conundra to which I shall 
return below. 
For now, it is worth noting that the actual vote itself was decisive: 
the No to independence won by a ten-point margin (55.3 percent to 44.7 
percent), while 28 out of 32 local government areas opted for Scotland 
to remain part of the UK, which corresponds to over 2 million people 
as against 1.6 million. The turnout was 84.7 percent—higher than in any 
other ballot since the 1951 general election, and there were nearly half a 
million first-time voters. For a long time, the polls had shown a 70–30 
split, so the Yes campaign exceeded expectations. But ultimately a silent 
majority in favor of the Union made its voice heard.
After a bruising referendum campaign that has left Scotland and 
the rest of the Union deeply divided, the UK now faces constitutional 
chaos—as the pledge to devolve more powers to the Scottish Parliament 
has intensified long-standing resentment about the under-representation 
of England within the UK. The Conservative Party of Prime Minister 
David Cameron has promised “English votes for English laws,” while the 
opposition Labour Party under its leader Ed Miliband is calling for a con-
stitutional convention to draw up a new settlement. This issue about the 
distribution of powers will dominate British politics in the run-up to the 
May 2015 general election and well beyond. In fact, it provides the back-
drop to the ongoing debates about the UK’s EU membership and Britain’s 
relationship with the Commonwealth and indeed the rest of the world, not 
least the “special relationship” with the United States.
Critics of the British constitution claim that only a fully-fledged fed-
eral system with a strict separation of powers would be able to resolve 
these issues, but such a formal federalism does not sit easily with Britain’s 
traditions of “mixed government” and the informal, organic ties between 
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the four nations of England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. 
Nor has formal federalism linked to a written constitution prevented the 
concentration of wealth and power at the central level in federal systems 
such as that of the United States.1 Crucially, liberal appeals to abstract 
principles such as “equality” or “fairness” fail because they ignore the 
traditions, institutions, and relationships that can give substantive meaning 
to formal rules and procedures.
For Britain, this means that democracy can perhaps best be revived 
in line with the traditions and institutions of “mixed government,” i.e., 
the interplay of the “one,” the “few,” and the “many”—or, in short, the 
monarchy, the aristocracy, and the people. The “monarchic one” and the 
“aristocratic few” includes much more than a seemingly arbitrary, dis-
proportionate role for those who benefit from hereditary privilege. Even 
today, monarchy and aristocracy encompass a vast array of corporate 
bodies under royal and lordly aegis—whose constitutional autonomy, 
relatively non-partisan continuity, and openness to more informal modes 
of participation balances and qualifies the formally sovereign power of the 
executive and the populace. This, coupled with intermediary institutions 
and the Church, has generated a polity of free association that contrasts 
radically with the oscillation between the controlling center and the con-
trolled individuals so beloved of unadulterated liberalism.
Connected with the renewal of mixed government is the need to 
devolve powers to localities and regions across England and the rest of the 
UK. Since late-modern liberal representative democracy seems increas-
ingly incapable of taking decisions in the long-term national interest of 
Britain (or indeed other countries), it falls to other institutions to take 
the lead—including the monarchy, the House of Lords, and the Church 
of England, along with other faith communities and civic movements 
such as CitizensUK.
Liberal Democracy’s Slide into Oligarchy and Demagoguery2
If there is one thing that the two sides in the Scottish referendum campaign 
agreed on, it is that the current state of Britain’s democracy is parlous. 
1. See Adrian Pabst, “Constitutionnalisme et «gouvernement mixte»: le christianisme 
face aux dérives de la démocratie libérale,” in Philippe Poirier, ed., Démocratie, Liberté et 
Religion (Paris: Ed. Parole et Silence, 2014), pp. 75–96.
2. For a number of arguments in this and the following section I am indebted to 
conversations with John Milbank and the book on The Politics of Virtue: Post-liberalism 
and the Human Future, which we are currently co-writing.
 AFTER THE SCOTTISH NO  11
Virtually all the key institutions of public life in Britain have been hit 
by scandals that highlight structural incompetence, moral corruption, and 
outright criminality—above all the expenses scandal involving many 
Members of Parliament in 2009 and the collusion of press and police 
as part of the phone-hacking scandal involving the media mogul Rupert 
Murdoch. To these one can add the sidelining of Parliament, the judiciary, 
and the civil service by an increasingly arrogant executive, as well as 
the dysfunctional regulation of financial services that have engaged in a 
whole host of criminal activities—from reckless lending via mis-selling 
financial products, charging usurious interest on credit cards, and rigging 
inter-bank lending rates and foreign exchange transactions, to laundering 
the money of terrorists and the global mafia.
More fundamentally, the rise of professional politicians has coin-
cided with the de-professionalization of politics in the sense of the loss 
of vocation and ethos.3 Amid falling voter turnout and a collapse in party 
membership compared with the post-1945 era, power has reverted from 
the wider population to small groups. The decline of Parliament, which 
is at the heart of British democracy, has contributed to the crisis of other 
public institutions through a lack of scrutiny and accountability of govern-
ment, the regulators, and other public or large-scale private organizations. 
All this has fueled popular anger and alienation from the ruling elites of 
the London establishment.
There are at least two fundamental reasons for this sorry state of affairs. 
One is that nineteenth- and twentieth-century institutions are inadequate 
to deal with twenty-first-century politics and business—whether political 
parties, or parliamentary selection, or the current set-up of many regulators 
and state agencies. All suffer from an old-style, top-down, command-
and-control approach that not only undermines effective accountability 
but also adds bureaucratic and managerial layers that render these bod-
ies ever-more inefficient, opaque, and vulnerable to corrupt practices. If 
anything, the expansive introduction of new technologies exacerbates the 
entire tendency to algorithmic self-regulation and simultaneous openness 
to both surveillance and remote manipulation.4 This is especially true for 
3. Peter Oborne, The Triumph of the Political Class, rev. ed. (London: Pocket Books, 
2008).
4. Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom (London: 
Penguin, 2011); Evgeny Morozov, To Save Everything, Click Here: Technology, Solution-
ism and the Urge to Fix Problems that Don’t Exist (London: Penguin, 2014); Jamie Bartlett, 
The Dark Net: Inside the Digital Underworld (London: William Heinemann, 2014).
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a liberal, utilitarian politics that subordinates human needs to the demands 
of capitalism and technological progress—maximizing the freedom of 
consumer choice instead of pursuing mutual flourishing.
The other reason is connected to the structure of institutions. It con-
cerns the centralization of power in the hands of small, self-serving elites 
that run state organizations with impunity and remain largely exempt 
from public scrutiny. Whether in the case of the MPs’ expenses scandal, 
or repeated financial scandals, or phone hacking, the debate in Parliament 
and in the press quickly focused on personal greed rather than systemic 
dysfunction. A few heads rolled, but most of the senior figures got away 
with it and the system remains largely intact. In fact, the prevailing mind-
set of far too many people in positions of power is that the normal rules do 
not apply to them and that their pursuit of narrow self-interest is the best 
way of promoting the common good. This illusion is akin to the liberal-
economic myth of trickle-down wealth—a rising tide that was assumed to 
lift all boats but in reality only lifts a few yachts.
Moreover, the public profession of liberal values such as “transpar-
ency” and “good governance” has created a procedural façade that masks 
a sinister collusion among numerous politicians, bankers, regulators, busi-
ness tycoons, journalists, and policemen. We are witnessing the triumph 
in cynical combination of what Christopher Lasch and Paul Piccone aptly 
termed “old elites” and “new classes.”5 Today Britain and other Western 
liberal democracies are in the hands of old business empires and political 
dynasties as well as new global conglomerates and a managerial-bureau-
cratic class linked to an international financial plutocracy.6
In Britain the centralization of power and concentration of wealth 
over the past forty years has been rightly described in terms of a new 
political class and a new oligarchy that together govern in increasingly 
authoritarian, illiberal, and anti-democratic ways.7 At the root of this is 
the elite’s contempt for the people and the refusal to give the public any 
5. See Christopher Lasch, The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy 
(New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1995); Paul Piccone, Confronting the Crisis. The Writ-
ings of Paul Piccone (New York: Telos Publishing Press, 2008). 
6. David J. Rothkopf, Superclass: The Global Power Elite and the World They Are 
Making (London: Little, Brown & Company, 2008); Chrystia Freeland, Plutocrats: The 
Rise of the New Global Super-Rich and the Fall of Everyone Else (London: Penguin, 2013).
7. Oborne, The Triumph of the Political Class; Ferdinand Mount, The New Few; Or 
a Very British Oligarchy (London: Simon & Schuster, 2012).
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real influence over decision- and policy-making while at the same time 
trying to manipulate them into endorsing the status quo. In consequence a 
small oligarchic class based in London is not only unable to understand the 
concerns of people in Scotland, Wales, and the North and West of England, 
but even those of the London-bordering county of Essex, whose people are 
turning to vote for the UK Independence Party in droves.8 
There and elsewhere, most people are becoming alienated from the 
mindset of the three main parties with frightening speed. In the face of 
this situation we are starting to see that the “politics of virtue” and shared 
ethical purpose is no mere luxury. For given this void, people are turning 
to various ersatz visions that articulate at once their material and their 
spiritual discontent. Typically these debased visions pivot upon blaming 
an unlikely “other” for modern discontents—whether this be the EU, or 
England, or immigrants, or globalization. Any account of the deeper crisis 
of democratic representation has to start from this recognition of a grave 
sociopolitical crisis in Britain and other liberal democracies.
Thus the widespread claim that corruption is limited to a “few rot-
ten apples” and that incompetence is confined to a small number of inept 
people ignores the wider system in which institutions and individuals 
operate. As Antony Barnett has argued, whoever is in power in Britain 
rules the country “through a mixture of top down controls and populist 
manipulation serviced by a narrow and venal political elite. While if the 
electorate feels there is no realistic offer of a choice to open up the system, 
continuing negative feedback of massive abstention will confirm popular 
revulsion, yet make the problem worse.”9 Here Peter Oborne is right to 
go further, saying that Britain is facing a structural crisis of its political 
system that, in the absence of real reform, could potentially lead to the 
return to the extra-parliamentary violence of the eighteenth century and 
the rise to power of a hard, populist right—of which UKIP (and to a lesser 
extent the populism of the SNP) is but a pale precursor. Beyond individual 
scandals, he writes, “clearly it is the more general failure—which includes 
of course the purchase of British politics by large corporations, the anti-
democratic control of foreign policy by the United States, the emergence 
8. See Robert Ford and Matthew J. Goodwin, Revolt on the Right: Explaining Sup-
port for the Radical Right in Britain (London: Routledge, 2014).
9. Antony Barnett, “From Anger into Change,” openDemocracy, July 9, 2009, 
available online at https://www.opendemocracy.net/blog/ourkingdom-theme/anthony-
barnett/2009/07/09/from-anger-into-change.
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of sophisticated techniques of mass manipulation drawn from the advertis-
ing profession—which is the more significant.”10
So for any government to pretend that it is either powerless to decide, 
or that it cannot decide otherwise, is always in reality to decide in a dis-
guised way by manipulating opinion. In addition this occurs by following 
either the most debased mass opinion or else the course of action that it 
can most easily get away with. And where a government has no sense that 
it has a duty to decide for justice and the long-term national and global 
good that is in excess of democratic norms, then its horizon for decision 
will be almost entirely self-serving. Such a government will be commit-
ted only to increasing its own power and influence in such a way that 
this is seen to be compatible with remaining in office, retaining the good 
will of its temporarily most powerful allies, and enjoying a minimum of 
popular consent. Today party-political and corporate-capitalist concerns 
have largely displaced that long-term linking by a political class of its own 
interests with that of the nation and indeed the world as a whole.
It is above all this necessary pandering to a populism, which it has 
itself both provoked and promoted, that tends to ensure that a govern-
ment theoretically guided by the lodestar of pure democracy will override 
the interests of minorities and the protection of individual freedom of 
conscience. For it is rather mixed government that retains a sense of its 
extra-democratic duty to take just decisions that will try to balance the 
desires of majorities with the legitimate interests of individuals and 
groups. For kindred reasons, an overweening executive claiming to act in 
the name of a national majority will tend to suspend or compromise formal 
constitutional arrangements (which have their important place). This has 
been threatened by certain party-political responses to the Scottish refer-
endum both before and after the vote, and by the bullying or harassing of 
opponents, as occurred with the less reputable aspects of Scotland’s first 
minister Alex Salmond’s campaign for Scottish independence. 
In short, the undoubted revival of popular participation in politics that 
was so evident in the run-up to the Scottish referendum is in large part a 
reaction against liberal democracy’s slide into oligarchy and demagogu-
ery. One could arguably call this moment the definitive end of “the end of 
history”—the finally exhibited demise of the sham conflict between left 
10. Peter Oborne, “The Political System Is Broken, Make Parliament the Focus,” 
openDemocracy, July 13, 2009, available online at https://www.opendemocracy.net/
blog/ourkingdom-theme/peter-oborne/2009/07/13/the-political-system-is-broken-make-
parliament-the-focus.
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and right, or of democracy and liberalism through the growing fusion of 
economic and political forces into one single populist plutocracy. Today 
the increasing amoralism of the administrative “new class” of arrivistes 
has corrupted even what remained of the sense of social obligation among 
older elites, with the result that a new sense of alienation and disenfran-
chisement begins from “the squeezed middle” downward.11
To some degree this phenomenon is occurring everywhere, and as a 
result we are seeing “popular” uprisings against corrupt power that lie 
outside the inherited channels of modern political activity: the now largely 
defunct Arab revolts may be but the most extreme manifestation of this 
new populism, which has also been instanced in Spain and Greece and 
now significantly in Israel, as well as by the “Tea Party” faction in the 
United States—not to mention UKIP and the Scots Nationalists within the 
UK. In a sense what is being rejected is the increased criminalization of 
political and economic power, which both lies behind and is reinforced by 
their newly reinforced collaboration.12
Thus for all these reasons modern liberal democracy destroys the 
inherited forms of mixed government in favor of a new oligarchy that not 
only produces a market anarchy policed by coercive state powers but also 
a new demagoguery and a new kind of “democratic despotism”—a spec-
tacle of general mass opinion that reinforces the middle-ground mush of 
managerialism. The latter marks the closing-down of argument and the 
ironing-out of plurality in the name of liberal individual freedom and col-
lective security.
In this manner, liberal democracy has produced a flattened-out non-
politics whose total ideological vacuity is filled by a new metropolitan 
moralism—a disdain for aristocratic honor, middle-class discipline, and 
working-class courage. In short, a contempt for virtue. Once again there is 
a curious convergence of left and right under the hegemony of liberalism. 
Both the left and the right are suspicious of the prevailing ethos of both 
the popular “moral economy” and the old establishment, and both seek to 
replace old working-class and old-aristocratic ethos with the new metro-
politan moralism whose major watchword is “diversity.” A pious siding 
with the underpaid and underprivileged by the left, or with “hard-working 
11. On the erosion of the American middle class by the tech “Oligarchy” based in 
Silicon Valley and the “Clerisy,” which encompasses the U.S. academic, media, and policy 
elites, see Joel Kotkin, The New Class Conflict (New York: Telos Publishing Press, 2014).
12. Thereby fulfilling St. Augustine’s view that states without justice are no more 
than enlarged bands of brigands.
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families” by the right, can barely detract from the truth that metropolitan 
elites have done nothing for the well-being of families (other their own 
and each others’) while colluding with posh criminals. As for the neolib-
eral mantra of supporting all those who are “doing the right thing,” that is 
not so much a principle as an alibi for the absence of one.
Amid the current crisis, the ruling elites are now more racked by doubt 
and uncertainty than at any point since the darkest days of the Cold War. 
But far from inducing a rethink, it has only produced more self-pitying 
and more small-mindedness. It is therefore no surprise that Britain has 
been captured by an anti-Westminster mood that is hemorrhaging support 
away from the established parties in favor of UKIP and the SNP. Yet more 
representative democracy will only perpetuate the hegemony of liberal 
despotism at the center and the resurgence of populist nationalism on the 
extreme left and right.
Renewing Britain’s Traditions of Mixed Government
After a bruising referendum campaign that has left Scotland and the rest of 
the Union divided, the UK now faces constitutional chaos amid demands 
for greater devolved powers to Scotland and a new settlement for England, 
which must all be met in a matter of months. After decades of permanent 
constitutional revolution (especially under Tony Blair) and growing popu-
lar alienation, the current constitutional arrangements are unsustainable 
and have left Britain’s unwritten norms and political habits in a ruinous 
state. In his seminal book on the British constitution, Anthony King puts 
this well:
The old constitution possessed a certain monumental grandeur, a certain 
cruciform, cathedral-like simplicity. Its architecture and ground plan 
could easily be grasped, at least in their essentials. But that old building 
now looks as though it has been bombed from above and undermined 
from below. Parts of the roof have fallen in, at least one of the tran-
septs has collapsed, and workmen have erected an untidy assortment of 
workshops and sheds inside the few walls still standing. Britain today 
has neither a brand new church, a postwar Coventry cathedral, nor a 
skilful restoration of an old church, like the Frauenkirche, Dresden, but 
something that looks a little bit like a bombed-out ruin left over from a 
major war.13
13. Anthony King, The British Constitution (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007), p. 351.
 AFTER THE SCOTTISH NO  17
The triumph of liberalism over the past century has coincided with the rise 
of forces that destroy Britain’s traditions of constitutionalism and mixed 
government. In fact, the last hundred years have seen an ever-greater 
tendency toward a unitary state, notably in the wake of the two world 
wars, which differs markedly from the imperial polity that was always 
more diffuse and multi-layered. Already in the early nineteenth century 
central power expanded, ironically as a result of introducing a free market 
in money, labor, and land.14 London also gradually increased its powers of 
taxation in order to finance war. Before 1914, the weight of the state in the 
national economy was about 10 percent of total output, whereas by 1918 
this had risen to nearly 40 percent, and since then it has rarely dropped 
below this level. After World War II, Britain’s fiscal state and warfare state 
were further enlarged by the welfare state. Crucially, both nationalization 
after 1945 and privatization after 1979 have reinforced the authority of the 
central state by creating an ever-greater bureaucracy and bypassing local 
government, whose powers have been severely curtailed.
This development, combined with de-industrialization and financial-
ization, produced an over-centralized, unitary state with power and wealth 
heavily concentrated in London and the South East. Meanwhile localities 
across the UK and the English regions remain powerless and at the mercy 
of the Treasury’s central diktat. All this has significantly contributed to 
the decade-long disillusionment with elected politicians in Westminster. 
The mainstream parties have attracted public anger and resentment about 
creeping centralization and the overbearing control of London over against 
regions and localities. Not so paradoxically, devolution to Scotland, Wales, 
and Northern Ireland has concentrated power in the hands of new, populist 
elites in the capital cities of Edinburgh, Cardiff, and Belfast at expense of 
regional and local levels. To reiterate: liberal democracy is guilty of foster-
ing populism in reaction because it combines the unaccountable power 
of the executive with a bloated bureaucracy dominated by technocrats. It 
is equally guilty of inciting an often crude romantic rebellion against its 
intolerable predilection for soulless prose and algorithmic formulation.
The patchwork of partial decentralization since Scottish and Welsh 
devolution under Blair’s New Labour government in 1998 cannot hide the 
14. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of 
Our Time (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001 [orig. pub. 1944]); see also Martin Daunton, State 
and Market in Victorian Britain: War, Welfare and Capitalism (Woodbridge: Boydell and 
Brewer, 2008).
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fact that Westminster and Whitehall hold supreme sway over local leaders 
who lack the necessary powers to transform their towns and conurbations. 
As Scotland prepares to get greater devolved powers following the victory 
of the No to independence, Britain’s other nations will still be largely ruled 
from London. To revive democracy, what is needed is to carry through the 
logic of devolution in line with the principle of subsidiarity, which means 
locating powers at the level that is most appropriate for the dignity and 
flourishing of the person. This tends to be lower ties such as regional or 
local government, neighborhood councils, and the parish level, but it can 
of course require action at higher levels. That, in turn, demands a new, 
overarching federal settlement across the British Isles—including the pos-
sibility of much closer political ties with the Irish Republic as part of the 
peace process in Northern Ireland and as a follow-up to Queen Elizabeth’s 
very successful state visit to Ireland in 2011. Such a settlement cannot be a 
top-down, “one-size-fits-all” construct by the Westminster elites, nor con-
formable to a liberal formalist “fairness” that just does not fit the complex 
facts. Instead, it has to reflect the country’s plurality—in particular the 
different contexts, needs, and interests in each locality, region, and nation.
Above all, a federal Britain needs to develop in line with the tradi-
tions of constitutionalism and mixed government. A mixed constitution 
outflanks in advance the tendency of liberal democracies to oscillate 
between popular sovereignty, on the one hand, and the power of the 
executive allied to the oligarchic interests of a few, on the other hand. 
Contrary to a strict separation of powers (as in the United States or to 
a degree in France) that leads either to institutional paralysis or to the 
domination of one branch of government (usually the executive), Brit-
ain’s mixed government has traditionally avoided this by giving proper 
constitutional recognition to the myriad of corporate bodies and interme-
diary institutions that stand between the individual and the central state (or 
increasingly the global market). 
Still today, despite much erosion of the UK’s unique tradition of tol-
erance, freedom under the law and public cooperation offer resources 
potentially to create a polity that pluralizes politics and extends the 
public realm beyond the modern duality of the state versus private associ-
ation—a civic covenant that might encompass the peoples and nations of 
these isles and of Britain’s global commonwealth, in a double refusal of 
both autonomous nationalism and suppression of regional identities and 
self-organization.
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Faced with the prospect of further devolved powers to Scotland follow-
ing the referendum, the future of the Union is now at stake—particularly 
after David Cameron’s promise to have “English votes for English 
laws.” The idea is only to allow MPs with constituencies in England to 
vote on English matters because they cannot vote on matters that have 
been devolved to the Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Irish assemblies—a 
problem known as “the West Lothian question.” Since the overwhelming 
bulk of business coming in front of the House of Commons concerns both 
England and the rest of the UK, Cameron’s proposal is either a gimmick 
to head off an electoral challenge from UKIP, which illustrates once again 
the dangers of an overweening executive that destroys the constitutional 
fabric for party-political purposes. 
Or else implementing “English votes for English laws” would tear the 
Union asunder by creating two classes of MPs and potentially a bifurcated 
government: if non-English MPs are barred from certain votes, then any 
party that relies on them for an overall parliamentary majority would be 
able to legislate on UK-wide matters but could be defeated on English-
only issues. In turn, that would effectively rule out non-English MPs from 
serving as Prime Minister or Chancellor of the Exchequer. Over time, such 
an arrangement would turn Britain into a confederacy and quite possibly 
unleash centrifugal forces that will end up balkanizing the country, creat-
ing resentment and reopening the question of Scottish independence. In 
consequence, this confirms the Conservative Party’s betrayal of union-
ism and retreat to a narrow nationalist stance in a desperate attempt to 
rival UKIP’s rabid nationalism. Once again, the mechanical procedures of 
liberal democracy subordinate national public interests to party-political 
calculations that provoke populist responses.
A separation of powers as part of a formal federalism with a written 
constitution is an equal threat to the organic ties that underpin Britain’s 
mixed government. Neither an English parliament (in addition to the Brit-
ish Parliament) nor a U.S.-style senate (instead of the House of Lords) 
would address the legitimate concerns about representing England’s 
interests or balance the interests of the three other constituent nations. 
Rather, the interests of England and the rest of the UK are best served 
by a radical devolution of powers to its towns, cities, and regions where 
individuals, communities, and associations can exercise more power over 
their own lives. This should not be mechanically equivalent to the per-
haps themselves differing degrees and modes of devolution offered to the 
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three Celtic nations. However, so long as it is substantial, as it should be, 
then surely the teeth of the West Lothian cartoon dragon will have been 
effectively drawn? The Westminster Parliament will then be actually, in 
a certain mode (though by no means strictly speaking), a federal British 
Parliament.
That it would also remain the English parliament is desirable for a 
number of reasons. It retains organic continuity, and a brand new English 
parliament (in, say, Manchester) would be artificial. Moreover, the huge 
numerical asymmetry of England requires that England remains a deci-
sive factor in federal union, as it represents over 85 percent of the UK’s 
total population and economy. Nor is turning the House of Lords into a 
federal chamber (such as a US-style senate) a good idea. Again it would 
be artificial, arbitrary, and bear no relation to Britain’s traditions of mixed 
government. Even more important is the need to balance constituency-
cum-individual with vocational-cum-wider-regional representation in the 
case of a federated Britain, since these additional identities and interests 
are crucial in sustaining UK-wide solidarity.
Hence it agreeably turns out that the most radical solution to current 
constitutional conundra—namely, drastic devolution within England, to 
match that to the Celtic countries—is also the most readily achievable and 
the most in continuity with recent existing measures, even if it also seeks 
to reverse the destruction of local government ever since Mrs. Thatcher. 
Devolution within England should itself be appropriately variegated—
sometimes to city-regions like Greater Manchester, Birmingham, 
Liverpool, Nottingham, or Newcastle (besides London that has already 
a directly elected mayor and assembly), and sometimes to pure provinces 
along the lines of the existing regional distinctions. These are largely 
reflective of the ancient Anglo-Saxon and British kingdoms of Northum-
bria, Rheged, Mercia, Wessex (plus Cornwall), East Anglia (plus Essex), 
and Sussex together with Kent. The identity of these kingdoms still echoes 
in those of the North, the Midlands, the West Country, East Anglia, and the 
South East. Therefore these contemporary regions are not simply artificial 
creations. The trick is to politicize existing cultural attachments, and this 
could readily arise if regional assemblies became speedily associated with 
local pride, increased economic development, and popular involvement in 
shaping regional character.
To agree to a new federal settlement along these lines, Britain needs 
something like a constitutional convention under royal and lordly aegis 
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with the involvement of citizens, businesses, unions, voluntary orga-
nizations, faith communities, and local government—using the civic 
mobilization of CitizensUK as an example.15 This would be a moment 
when people from different institutions, regions, vocations, and interests 
would come together to debate the distribution of power across the UK, 
including questions about how to bring about devolution to city-regions, 
regions, and local councils, or how to hold public institutions to account. 
Rather than decide the outcome of such deliberations, people in leadership 
positions should steer the discussions and help to draw up proposals that 
would go forward to Parliament. A citizens-led process can mitigate the 
sectional interests of politicians and the formalism of lawyers. 
The overarching task of such a convention would be to propose a new 
constitutional settlement that restates the purpose and functioning of the 
British polity. Instead of a formal codification or even a written constitution 
that would be drafted by the convention and then voted on in a plebiscite, 
an alternative in line with Britain’s traditions of mixed government would 
focus on parliamentary sovereignty precisely because it fuses popular with 
monarchic and aristocratic sovereignty. Therefore Parliament should have 
a free vote on all the proposals drawn up at the convention. As with the “in 
perpetuity” guarantee to the devolved assemblies as part of the legislation 
on devolution in 1998, Britain’s mixed constitution eschews liberal for-
mality (which is also subject to suspension in case of emergency) in favor 
of the informality and pragmatic non-revisability of such agreements.
For reasons that go beyond the scope of the present essay, a new 
constitutional settlement for the Union that aims to enhance popular 
participation in the shared polity will paradoxically require a stronger 
involvement of both the monarchy and the aristocracy—neither of which 
can simply be reduced to hereditary privilege and unaccountable power. 
However questionable the past role in Britain of kings and lords may 
have been (and today it unquestionably needs reforming, revising, and 
extending), their share in government has helped keep elected politicians 
in check—whether the Crown-in-Parliament or indeed House of Lords 
opposition to draconian legislation proposed by the government and voted 
by the House of Commons. Thus the mode of mixed constitution can cru-
cially help to defend a democratic pursuit of the common good against 
15. See, for example, Austen Ivereigh, Faithful Citizens: A Practical Guide to Catho-
lic Social Teaching and Community Organising (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 2010).
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an unrepresentative and high-handed executive, a growing moneyed oli-
garchy, an overweening judiciary, and the suppression of more informal 
manifestations of citizens’ interests.
Union, Commonwealth, and the Future of Europe
Had the Scots voted for independence, it would have been hard to over-
state the implications for Scotland and the rest of Britain. The former 
would have faced protracted economic uncertainty, doubts over EU mem-
bership, and a shortage of national defense capabilities. For Britain, the 
loss of Scotland would have been devastating both symbolically and in 
real terms—the end of a 300-year-long union during which time Britain 
became the globe’s largest empire of all times. After years of sacrificing its 
armed forces on the altar of austerity, the rest of the UK would have lost 
access to the strategically significant naval bases at Faslane and Coulport 
in the Firth of Clyde on the Scottish west coast on which Britain’s nuclear 
deterrent currently depends. Leaving aside the exposure to financial 
meltdown in Scotland, London’s role in Europe would have been much 
diminished. Without Scotland’s positive influence, the UK’s exit from the 
EU and its retreat to “splendid isolation” looms large, while the rest of 
Europe already sees Britain as a declining force on account of its ambiva-
lent stance. Britain now faces the prospect—despite its being far from 
inevitable—of becoming a glorified Singapore: a city-state with some 
rural hinterland in a world of old and new imperial powers. So Scotland’s 
independence might well have spelled the end of the UK as a multinational 
association that shares risks, rewards, and resources based on fusing con-
tribution with solidarity.
The potential consequences for Europe are similarly hard to overstate. 
Scotland’s independence could have triggered a wave of secessionism 
in Europe—from Catalonia and the Basque Country in Spain, via Wal-
lonia and Flanders in Belgium, to the Balkans and beyond. This, coupled 
with the current wave of populism and nationalism, might have led to 
the unraveling of the European integration process, starting with the 
much-maligned eurozone. Moreover, without a more sustained and posi-
tive involvement on the part of Britain, the EU will continue to lack a 
clear geopolitical vision. Alongside Russia, Britain is the only power in 
the wider Europe with a truly global outlook, and as long as both remain 
on the margins of the EU Europe’s role in the world will be increasingly 
marginal compared with that of the United States and China. Right now 
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Britain and the EU increasingly look like an annex to the United States, 
which oscillates between isolationism and interventionism. Meanwhile 
Russia is fast becoming a vassal state that supplies cheap resources to 
China. After more than five hundred years at the center of international 
affairs, the whole of Europe seems bereft of ideas and incapable of acting 
as a force for good.
Globally, especially in relation to Britain’s commonwealth partners, 
an isolated English nation-state would be a wholly artificial reality, deny-
ing the reality of its own Celtic fringes (Cornwall, Cumbria, the Welsh 
Marches, and the Scottish Borders), just as an independent Scottish nation 
would tend to deny its heavy Anglo-Saxon, Norse, Brithonic, and reli-
giously Catholic components. The implications for the Commonwealth 
and other immigrants to the British Isles would also be negative: in fact the 
British, “imperial” identity is for them the most civic and non-racial one.
With Scotland remaining in the Union, Britain has a unique and 
perhaps final chance of crafting a more imaginative foreign policy and 
playing a transformative part in international affairs, especially across the 
wider Europe. The historical and cultural connections that the combined 
European and Commonwealth linkages offer are perhaps Britain’s single 
greatest asset. Like the Union at home, the EU and the Commonwealth are 
potentially (and to some considerable extent already in reality) genuine 
alternatives to (federal or unitary) superstates, on the one hand, and global-
ized free-trade zones, on the other hand. They are more like multinational 
associations of peoples who are bound together by social and cultural ties 
and who share risks, rewards, and resources—as I have already indicated 
and argued in greater detail elsewhere.16
To invoke Britain’s combined European and Commonwealth con-
nections together with its Anglo-Saxon bonds is reminiscent of Oliver 
Frank’s Reith Lectures in the early 1950s on Britain as the center of “the 
three interlocking circles” of the United States, Europe, and the Common-
wealth—a vision that was never embraced by any postwar government. 
Instead, different administrations focused on the wider Anglo-sphere 
and the “special relationship” with the United States, or else they turned 
almost exclusively to the European continent. Either way, both the Con-
servatives and Labour neglected the Commonwealth, which the monarchy 
16. See Adrian Pabst, “Commonwealth and Covenant: The West in a Neo-Medieval 
Era of International Affairs,” Telos 168 (Fall 2014): 107–31.
24  ADRIAN PABST
helped keep together.17 Crucially, successive parties in power abandoned 
independent strategic thinking, particularly in relation to India, which was 
first allied with the Soviet Union and since then has forged a close partner-
ship with the United States largely because Britain and Europe have failed 
to offer any alternative.18 Perhaps most of all, postwar Britain has focused 
far too much on state and market power and therefore acknowledges far 
too little the social and cultural links and ties—both old and new—with 
the rest of world, especially the great booming cities, regions, and nations 
of the Commonwealth network.19
It follows from this that in the international arena also, the social 
really is primary—the flow of cultures, religions, customs, fashions, and 
influences across borders is what most of all binds the globe together. A 
successful future international politics needs to go with this flow and the 
UK is, by inheritance and inclination, in a good position to seize the initia-
tive in this respect and to join up in a new way the countries of the EU with 
their former colonial possessions. It is crucial here that—especially since 
9/11—London is now unrivalled as the pivotal global city and that the main 
metropolises are increasingly dominating both politics and business.20
Indeed the current crisis of the eurozone, with its potential threat to 
the very existence of the EU, despite Britain’s past irresponsibility with 
respect to the that organization, potentially gives the UK the chance to 
take the lead in crafting a “European Commonwealth.” Such a common-
wealth would be a loose federal association defined by a shared religious 
and intellectual legacy, besides a shared ethical, social, and political cul-
ture—rather than being a superstate, on the one hand, or a mere neoliberal 
free-trading zone, on the other.21 Taking this lead has become urgent in the 
17. Philip Murphy, Monarchy and the End of Empire: The House of Windsor, the 
British Government, and the Postwar Commonwealth (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2013).
18. Ian Hall, Dilemmas of Decline: British Intellectuals and World Politics, 1945–
1975 (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2012).
19. David Howell, Old Links and New Ties: Power and Persuasion in an Age of 
Networks (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013).
20. As Benjamin Barber suggests, “The nation-state is failing us on the global scale. 
It is utterly unsuited to interdependence. The city, always the human habitat of first resort, 
has in today’s globalizing world once again become democracy’s best hope.” See Ben-
jamin R. Barber, If Mayors Ruled the World: Dysfunctional Nations, Rising Cities (New 
Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2013), p. 3.
21. See Adrian Pabst, “Commonwealth or Market-State? Europe’s Christian Heritage 
and the Future of the European Polity,” in Jonathan Chaplin and Gary Wilton, eds., God 
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face of France’s growing crisis and Germany’s current desire to impose 
“Asiatic” disciplines of an undemocratic capitalism upon the southern 
European countries, while progressively weakening its own internal social 
market. As an alternative to this process Britain needs to encourage France 
to adopt once again a more global outlook and Germany to export its own 
in many ways exemplary economic model (though it needs radicalization 
and a removal from an all too statist mode of corporatism) in adaptively 
different ways to other European countries. This might involve some 
blending with the rather more mutualist structures of welfare provision in 
the Latin polities. Any such moves would require a greater internal bal-
ancing, whereby Germany learned to consume more and other European 
countries to produce and export more.22
But this renewed world-mission will only be possible if the UK re-
covers its nerve at home and re-comprehends and re-envisions its own 
European and British political and economic legacy in terms of the pri-
macy of the social. The latter, like the notion of economic growth and 
political representation, was greatly augmented by the Christian irruption 
that placed “free association” for purposes of social harmony and recon-
ciliation beyond the reach of legal coercion and enforcement, while also 
engendering the Church as the first trans-political international society. It is 
for this reason far from being accidental that churches and other religious 
bodies are today at the forefront—both at home and abroad—of renewing 
civil society, often in tandem with constitutional monarchies. In its secular 
mode by contrast, civil society has scarcely proved capable of resisting the 
materialist depredations of an uprooted economy and politics that we owe 
largely to liberal imperialism since the late nineteenth century, including 
Wilsonian democratic idealism that has informed recent liberal “humani-
tarian interventions” and neo-con crusades.
Once again Britain’s legacy of mixed government is the key to unlock 
the potential for a more creative vision of the country’s role in Europe and 
the world. In the current situation of a globalized economic empire under 
the hegemony of the United States, it is important to realize that the UK 
and the EU: Retrieving the Christian Inspirations of the European Project (London: Rout-
ledge, forthcoming in 2015), ch. 6.
22. See Adrian Pabst, “Constitutional Political Economy: Pathways for the Eurozone 
beyond Ordo-liberalism and Neo-Functionalism,” in Ivano Cardinale, D’Maris Coffman, 
and Roberto Scazzieri, eds., The Political Economy of the Eurozone (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge UP, forthcoming in 2015), ch. 7.
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is actually not a nation-state, nor even a modern state at all. In fact, the 
term belongs to the formalism of early modern Continental jurisprudence, 
founded on the triply formalist basis (recognizing only subjective rights 
and increasingly a merely positivist basis for law) of “politics, police and 
politesse”—as Carl Schmitt was right to argue.23 
Rather, Britain is an island empire defined not by geographical bounds 
but by a claimed service of the common good and personal rule (through 
constitutional monarchy and Church establishment), which is a positive 
resource. Indeed, globalization has effectively destroyed the autonomy of 
the “Continental” state, alongside the apparent “anarchy” of the interna-
tional realm lying between such states, which rendered warfare in theory 
but a formalist game between rivals, immune to ethical norms. This was 
the era whose passing Schmitt wrongly and in a non-Catholic fashion 
lamented.24 By contrast, the inherited internationalization of Britain’s civic 
empire as “commonwealth” can permit us to entertain the future project of 
infusing global structures with more constitutionalism and respect for civil 
society through an exercise of cultural influence and, where necessary, 
juridical linkages or guarantees and, as a final recourse, military interven-
tion. A Scotland that has chosen to remain part of the Union makes a more 
internationally engaged Britain a possibility once more.
Concluding Reflections
The Scottish referendum has done more to re-energize British politics 
than any other issue over the past few decades, but there are dangers that 
greater popular participation will be short-lived and give way to the lib-
eral oscillation between technocracy and populism. If Britain and indeed 
other countries want to renew democratic rule, they need to acknowledge 
that both liberalism and purely representative democracy have deficits and 
tend to slide into both oligarchy and demagoguery. 
Democracy, which is “the rule of the many,” can only function without 
manipulation of opinion if it is balanced by an “aristocratic” element of the 
pursuit of truth and virtue for their own sake on the part of some people 
whose role is legitimate even if they remain only “the few,” although they 
should ideally be themselves as far as possible “the many.” Democracy 
23. Carl Schmitt, Hamlet or Hecuba: The Intrusion of Time into the Play, trans. David 
Pan and Jennifer Rust (New York: Telos Press Publishing, 2009), pp. 63–65.
24. See Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of Jus Publi-
cum Europaeum (New York: Telos Press Publishing, 2003).
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equally requires the “monarchic” sense of an architectonic imposition 
of intrinsic justice by a transcendent “one,” however constituted, that is 
unmoved by either the prejudices of “the few” or those of “the many.” 
Instead of a strict separation of powers and formalism so beloved of 
liberals, Britain would do best to revise, renew, and extend its own best 
traditions of constitutionalism and mixed government. External subsid-
iarity, like internal, implies a sharing of power in contrast either to its 
complete fragmentation or monopolization at the center. This implies that 
the UK should regard its geopolitical position as an asset rather than a 
dilemma, allowing it to mediate between the Anglo-Saxon domain, the 
Commonwealth, and the EU, and to help build multinational associations 
that pool sovereignty. While liberal democracy leads to a growing concen-
tration of power and wealth, such an alternative can direct state and market 
power to the common good and mutual flourishing.
